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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the
Appellant's Brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The Defendant, George Aaron Powell ("Powell"), appeals from the

judgment, conviction and sentence in Fifth District Court of assault against a
peace officer, a class A misdemeanor; interference with an arresting officer, a
class B misdemeanor; and no evidence of security, a class B misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Powell was charged by information with assault against a peace officer, in

violation of § 76-5-102.4, Utah Code Ann.; interference with an arresting officer,
in violation of § 76-8-305, Utah Code Ann.; and no evidence of security, in
violation of § 41-12a-303.2, Utah Code Ann. (R. 1-2). Trial on all charges was
held on March 10, 2006 (R. 103).
During the course of the trial, Powell pled guilty to count 2, interference
with an arresting officer (R. 59).l The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the other
two counts as well (R. 63, 103:82).

1

Despite an indication in the minute orders that Powell pled guilty to count
2 during a meeting in chambers (R. 58-59), the plea was apparently not transcribed
and there is no written documentation of it in the record. Despite the presumptive
2

On April 25, 2006, Powell was sentenced to one year in jail on the assault
charge and six months on each of the other two counts (R. 80-82, 104:5). All jail
time was suspended and Powell was placed on 24 months probation (id.).
Powell filed timely pro se notices of appeal on May 2, 2006 and May 9,
2006 (R. 83, 84-85) and his attorney also filed a timely notice of appeal on May 9,
2006 (R. 87). This appeal follows.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
All charges arose from an incident that occurred on March 19, 2005, in
which Officer Clayton Lucas of the St. George City Police Department observed a
van being operated with both a temporary registration permit and a license plate
(R. 103:15, 16). Officer Lucas initiated a traffic stop, approached the driver
(Powell), explained the reason for the stop, and asked to see Powell's driver's
license, registration, and proof of insurance (R. 103:17-18). Powell handed the
vehicle registration of Lucas and held his driver's license up for Lucas to see (R.
103:18). Lucas ultimately reached through the window and took the license from
Powell (R. 103:18). Officer Lucas testified that he again asked for the proof of
insurance, but instead of answering Powell began to open his car door (R. 103:18).

noncompliance with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Powell did not seek
to withdraw his plea and the issue is not presently before this Court.
3

Lucas pushed against the door with his hand and asked Powell to remain in
the vehicle (R. 103:18-19). Powell pushed the door open, pushing the officer back
and off balance, and got out of the van (R. 103:19).
Officer Lucas testified that Powell's fists were clenched, his teeth were
gritted, and he was breathing hard (R. 103:19). Lucas backed away, warning
Powell "at least four times" to get back in the vehicle, and pulled his taser from its
holster (R. 103:20). The taser was never deployed, however (see, e.g., R. 130:23).
Lucas also called for backup because he feared for his safety (R. 103:22).
However, Powell never verbally threatened Lucas nor did he attempt to strike him
(R. 103:40-41).
Powell told Lucas, "I can do whatever I want and I'm not getting back in"
(R. 103:23). Powell then opened the rear door of his van, grabbed the temporary
permit and pulled it off the window, wadded it up and threw it into the back of the
van, and got back into the driver's seat (R. 103:23).
At that point the backup officers had arrived and Lucas had decided to
arrest Powell for assault on a police officer (R. 103:23). He asked Powell to get
out of the vehicle; Powell did so, with the "same demeanor" as previously (i.e.,
fists clenched, gritted teeth, and visibly angry) (R, 103:23-24). Powell then
dropped his head and arms and turned around to be arrested (R. 103:24).
After obtaining a medical clearance for a Powell's pre-existing knee injury,
Lucas processed the arrest on the aforementioned charges (R. 3-4, 103:41-42).
Trial and appeal followed accordingly.
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because the jury was instructed that it must find Powell acted intentionally
in his interactions with Officer Lucas and because there was no evidence
introduced that Powell intended to harm the officer, the evidence was insufficient
to sustain the verdict.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence Was Insufficient to Show that Powell Intended to
Assault Officer Lucas.

Where the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt on each element
a crime, the verdict cannot be sustained. See Colwell, 2000 UT at If 42, 994 P.2d
at 185-86. Here, the state lacked evidence supporting a critical element of assault
- t h e mens rea2
With regard to the charge that Powell assaulted a police officer, the jury in
this case was instructed in pertinent part as follows (R. 74):
The following are the elements of the crime of ASSAULT
AGAINST A PEACE OFFICER:
1.

the defendant intentionally:

9

The issue was preserved when trial counsel moved for dismissal based on
the prosecution's "failure to meet the burden of proof in this matter" (R. 103:57;
see also 103:83, defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.)
5

a.

attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another;

b.

threatened, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury
to another; or

c.

committed an act, with unlawful force or
violence, that caused or created a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another;

2.

the victim was a peace officer;

3.

at the time the defendant committed any act(s)
described in element 1, the defendant knew that the
victim was a peace officer;

4.

at the time the defendant committed any act(s)
described in element 1, the peace officer was acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer ...

(emphasis added).
The mens rea of "intentionally" is therefore appropriately applied to each
subset listed below section (1). The jury could convict Powell only if it found that
he intentionally attempted to bodily injure a peace officer; intentionally threatened
bodily injury with a show of violence; or intentionally committed an act that
caused or created a substantial risk of injury. A person acts "intentionally," as the
jury was instructed, "when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result" (R. 73; see also §76-2-103(1), Utah
Code Ann.)

6

The state's evidence on Powell's mental state consisted of Officer Lucas's
testimony that Powell pushed the car door against Lucas's hand and got out of the
car breathing hard, with his teeth gritted and his arms "coming up" with fists
clenched (R. 103:19). Powell was uncooperative about giving his driver's license
to Officer Lucas (R. 103:18) and failed to comply with multiple commands that he
get back into his vehicle (R. 103:20). Powell was undeterred by Lucas's implied
threat to use a taser on him (R. 103:22) and told Lucas that he could do whatever
he wanted and he was not getting back in his car (R. 103:23). Lucas also testified
that Powell's demeanor was the same when he later commanded Powell to get out
of the car (R. 103:23-24). Another police officer, who arrived after Powell had
gotten back into the van, also testified that Powell appeared "very agitated, very
angry ... just wanted to get out some frustration, some rage" (R. 103:50). This
second officer testified that Powell "glared" at Officer Lucas and was "puffed up,"
with his fists clenched and a "real pissed-off' look on his face (R. 103:50).
However, Powell never verbally threatened Lucas (R. 103:40). He never
attempted to strike the officer, nor did he voice any desire to do so (R. 103:40-41).
As it turned out, Powell did not push the car door against Officer Lucas's hand to
injure him, but rather to get out of the car and remove the temporary tag from the
back of his van (R. 103:23). Officer Lucas never even felt sufficiently threatened

3

This paragraph marshals the evidence in the record on Powell's mental
state and is intended to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), requiring that a
"party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding."
7

to deploy the taser {see R. 103:23).
Thus, there was no evidence whatsoever before the jury that Powell
intentionally attempted to injure Officer Lucas, intentionally threatened an injury
with a show of violence; or intentionally committed an act that caused or created a
substantial risk of injury. All the prosecution established was that Powell intended
to get out of his car, or that he intended to disregard Lucas's order to remain in the
vehicle.4
" c[I]ntent to commit [a crime] may be found from proof of facts from
which it reasonably could be believed that such was the defendant's intent.' "
Colwell, 2000 UT at \ 42, 994 P.2d at 186, citing State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603,
605 (Utah 1985) and quoting State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 317, 392 P.2d 486,
488 (1964)). Here, there was no evidence that Powell intended to harm or create
a substantial risk of injury to Lucas. Lacking sufficient evidence on an essential
element of the crime, the mental state, Powell's conviction for assault on a peace
officer must be overturned.

4

The prosecutor argued in closing that Powell caused Lucas to get "pushed
back into th[e] line of traffic," which would "cause or create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the officer" (R. 103:67). However, Officer Lucas actually
testified that "when that door was forced open it did push me back out into the
street, but at the same time I'm stepping off of that line ... and go the other way so
that I not only am not going into the street, but I can head towards my vehicle ..."
(R. 44).
8

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and authorities, George Aaron Powell asks that
this Court vacate his conviction and sentence for assault on a peace officer and
remand for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of March, 2007.

Margaret P/Lindsay
Julia Thomas
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to Brock Belnap, Washington County Attorney, 178 North 200
East, St. George, Utah 84770, this 2nd day of March, 2007.

ADDENDA

§ 76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another.

§ 76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer-Penalty
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a
peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
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